About This Book
This book is the first philosophy book of British philosopher Bertrand Russell, first published in 1900 with a second edition in 1937.
Russell, the founder of analytic philosophy and a famous critic of religions, chose to start his philosophy career with a publication about the philosophy of German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
Russell attempted to reveal that Leibniz case for God is contradictory to his core philosophy.
Russell would continue to question religions more profoundly. In 1927 he wrote the essay Why I am not a Christian?
that he expanded into a dedicated book in 1957 in which he challenges the God or uncaused cause
concept. In 1952 Russell wrote the book Is There a God?
that addresses the question as well.
Friedrich Nietzsche, famous for the claim God is dead
, appears to have found the metaphysical foundation for his philosophy in Leibniz's theories.
Russell writes the following admiration for Leibniz in the preface of the second edition of his book, 37 years later:
Leibniz's logic was simpler than that with which I have credited him. ... My views as to the philosophy of Leibniz are still those which I held in 1900. His importance as a philosopher has become more evident than it was at that date, owing to the growth of mathematical logic and the simultaneous discovery of his MSS. on that and kindred subjects. His philosophy of the empirical world is now only a historical curiosity, but in the realm of logic and the principles of mathematics many of his dreams have been realized.
A discussion on the forum I Love Philosophy revealed however that prominent theological and Christian philosophers in 2025 hold Leibniz in high esteem and consider his case for God authentic.
Christian philospher:
I think my moral argument for God's existence is similar to Leibniz's cosmological argument.(2025) Einstein's Philosophy Source: I Love Philosophy Forum
This book publication allows a deeper investigation of Leibniz's philosophy. While Russell's case may look sound with profound substantiation, a flaw was easily discovered.
In chapter § 64 Russell writes:
For the present, it is enough to place a dilemma before Leibniz. If the plurality lies only in the percipient, there cannot be many percipients, and thus the whole doctrine of monads collapses.
At first sight this assertion is invalid, since infinite perceptions (that monads represent) are not an aggregate which implies that there is no fundamental requirement for unity among multiplude percipients.
AI suggested that Leibniz would have responded with the following:
Russell's claim that the doctrine of monads
collapsesif plurality lies only in the percipient misunderstands how Leibniz ties plurality to perception, so the kind of reply you sketch is very close to what Leibniz's position supports. Leibniz does indeed hold that each monad has infinitely many perceptions and that numerical diversity among monads is grounded not in different objects perceived but in different degrees, clarity, and ordering of perception, and this allows him to reject the idea that a plurality of percipients must form anaggregatein the problematic sense Russell relies on.
This publication allows a critical examination of both Leibniz' and Russell's theories.