The Monadology (1714)

A metaphysical theory of ∞ infinite monads by German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

Printed on December 14, 2024

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Table of Contents (TOC)

1.Introduction

2.The Monadology

2.1.§ 1

2.2.§ 2

2.3.§ 3

2.4.§ 4

2.5.§ 5

2.6.§ 6

2.7.§ 7

2.8.§ 8

2.9.§ 9

2.10.§ 10

2.11.§ 11

2.12.§ 12

2.13.§ 13

2.14.§ 14

2.15.§ 15

2.16.§ 16

2.17.§ 17

2.18.§ 18

2.19.§ 19

2.20.§ 20

2.21.§ 21

2.22.§ 22

2.23.§ 23

2.24.§ 24

2.25.§ 25

2.26.§ 26

2.27.§ 27

2.28.§ 28

2.29.§ 29

2.30.§ 30

2.31.§ 31

2.32.§ 32

2.33.§ 33

2.34.§ 34

2.35.§ 35

2.36.§ 36

2.37.§ 37

2.38.§ 38

2.39.§ 39

2.40.§ 40

2.41.§ 41

2.42.§ 42

2.43.§ 43

2.44.§ 44

2.45.§ 45

2.46.§ 46

2.47.§ 47

2.48.§ 48

2.49.§ 49

2.50.§ 50

2.51.§ 51

2.52.§ 52

2.53.§ 53

2.54.§ 54

2.55.§ 55

2.56.§ 56

2.57.§ 57

2.58.§ 58

2.59.§ 59

2.60.§ 60

2.61.§ 61

2.62.§ 62

2.63.§ 63

2.64.§ 64

2.65.§ 65

2.66.§ 66

2.67.§ 67

2.68.§ 68

2.69.§ 69

2.70.§ 70

2.71.§ 71

2.72.§ 72

2.73.§ 73

2.74.§ 74

2.75.§ 75

2.76.§ 76

2.77.§ 77

2.78.§ 78

2.79.§ 79

2.80.§ 80

2.81.§ 81

2.82.§ 82

2.83.§ 83

2.84.§ 84

2.85.§ 85

2.86.§ 86

2.87.§ 87

2.88.§ 88

2.89.§ 89

2.90.§ 90

Chapter

Chapter 1.

Introduction

The Monadology (1714) by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

In 1714, German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - worlds last universal genius - proposed a theory of ∞ infinite monads that, while seemingly far removed from physical reality and at odds with modern scientific realism, has been reconsidered in light of developments in modern physics and more specifically non-locality.

Leibniz in turn was profoundly influenced by Greek philosopher Plato and ancient Greek cosmic philosophy. His monad theory bears a remarkable resemblance to Plato's realm of Forms as described in Plato's famous Cave Allegory.

The Monadology (French: La Monadologie, 1714) is one of Leibniz's best known works of his later philosophy. It is a short text which presents, in some 90 paragraphs, a metaphysics of simple substances, or ∞ infinite monads.

During his last stay in Vienna from 1712 to September 1714, Leibniz wrote two short texts in French which were meant as concise expositions of his philosophy. After his death, Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison, which was intended for prince Eugene of Savoy, appeared in French in the Netherlands. Philosopher Christian Wolff and collaborators published translations in German and Latin of the second text which came to be known as The Monadology.

Chapter 2.

The Monadology

By Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1714

Principia philosophiæ seu theses in gratiam principis Eu-genii conscriptæ

Chapter 2.1.

§ 1

The Monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into compounds; simple, meaning without parts (Theodicy, § 10⁴).

Chapter 2.2.

§ 2

And there must be simple substances since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simples.

Chapter 2.3.

§ 3

Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension, nor shape, nor possible divisibility. These Monads are the true Atoms of Nature and, in short, the elements of things.

Chapter 2.4.

§ 4

Il n'y a aussi point de dissolution à craindre, et il n'y a aucune manière concevable par laquelle une substance simple puisse périr naturellement (§ 89).

Chapter 2.5.

§ 5

For the same reason, there is no way in which a simple substance could begin naturally, since it cannot be formed by composition.

Chapter 2.6.

§ 6

Thus, one can say that Monads can only begin or end all at once, that is, they can only begin by creation and end by annihilation; whereas what is compound begins or ends by parts.

Chapter 2.7.

§ 7

There is also no way to explain how a Monad could be altered or changed internally by any other creature, since nothing can be transposed within it, nor can there be conceived within it any internal motion that could be excited, directed, increased, or diminished, as can happen in compounds where there are changes among the parts. Monads have no windows through which anything could enter or leave. Accidents cannot detach themselves and walk about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a Monad from outside.

Chapter 2.8.

§ 8

Nevertheless, Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be beings. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no way to perceive any change in things, since what is in the compound can only come from its simple ingredients; and if Monads were without qualities, they would be indistinguishable from one another, since they also do not differ in quantity. Consequently, assuming a plenum, each place would always receive, in any motion, only the equivalent of what it had before, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from another.

Chapter 2.9.

§ 9

It is even necessary that each Monad be different from every other. For there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike and in which it is impossible to find an internal difference or one based on an intrinsic denomination.

Chapter 2.10.

§ 10

I also take for granted that every created being is subject to change, and consequently the created Monad as well, and indeed that this change is continuous in each.

Chapter 2.11.

§ 11

Il s'ensuit de ce que nous venons de dire, que les changements naturels des Monades viennent d'un principe interne, puisqu'une cause externe ne saurait influer dans son intérieur (§ 396, § 900).

Chapter 2.12.

§ 12

But besides the principle of change, there must also be a detail of what changes, which constitutes, so to speak, the specification and variety of simple substances.

Chapter 2.13.

§ 13

This detail must involve a multiplicity in unity or in the simple. For since every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains. Consequently, there must be a plurality of affections and relations in the simple substance, although it has no parts.

Chapter 2.14.

§ 14

The transient state which involves and represents a multiplicity in unity or in the simple substance is nothing other than what we call Perception, which should be distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will become clear in what follows. This is where the Cartesians made a great mistake, by treating as negligible those perceptions of which we are not conscious. This is also what led them to believe that only spirits were Monads, that there were no souls of Beasts or other Entelechies. With the common people, they confused a long stupor with death in the strict sense, which led them to fall into the scholastic prejudice of completely separate souls, and even confirmed misguided minds in their belief in the mortality of souls.

Chapter 2.15.

§ 15

The action of the internal principle which produces the change or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that appetite cannot always completely attain the whole perception toward which it tends, but it always obtains something of it and reaches new perceptions.

Chapter 2.16.

§ 16

We experience ourselves a multiplicity in the simple substance when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who recognize that the soul is a simple substance should recognize this multiplicity in the Monad; and Mr. Bayle should not have found any difficulty in this, as he did in his Dictionary article Rorarius.

Chapter 2.17.

§ 17

Moreover, one must confess that Perception and what depends on it is inexplicable by mechanical reasons, that is, through shapes and motions. Suppose there were a machine whose structure produced thinking, feeling, and perception; one could conceive of it as enlarged while maintaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, as one enters into a mill. That being so, on examining its interior, we would find only parts that push one another, and never anything that could explain perception. Thus, it is in the simple substance, and not in the compound or in the machine, that perception must be sought. Indeed, this is all that can be found in the simple substance—namely, perceptions and their changes. It is also in this alone that all the Internal Actions of simple substances can consist (Pref. ***, 2 b⁵).

Chapter 2.18.

§ 18

On pourrait donner le nom d'Entéléchies à toutes les substances simples, ou Monades créées, car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (échousi to entelés), il y a une suffisance (autarkeia) qui les rend sources de leurs actions internes et pour ainsi dire des automates incorporels (§ 87).

Chapter 2.19.

§ 19

If we wish to call Soul everything that has perceptions and appetites in the general sense I have just explained, then all simple substances or created Monads could be called Souls. But since sentiment is something more than a mere perception, I agree that the general name of Monads and Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have only that, and that we should call Souls only those whose perception is more distinct and accompanied by memory.

Chapter 2.20.

§ 20

Car nous expérimentons en nous-mêmes un état, où nous ne nous souvenons de rien et n'avons aucune perception distinguée ; comme lorsque nous tombons en défaillance, ou quand nous sommes accablés d'un profond sommeil sans aucun songe. Dans cet état l'âme ne diffère point sensiblement d'une simple Monade ; mais comme cet état n'est point durable, et qu'elle s'en tire, elle est quelque chose de plus (§ 64).

Chapter 2.21.

§ 21

And it does not follow that the simple substance is then without any perception. This cannot be, for the reasons stated above; for it cannot perish, nor can it subsist without some affection, which is nothing other than its perception: but when there is a great multitude of small perceptions, where nothing is distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously in the same direction several times in succession, where dizziness comes that can make us faint and leaves us unable to distinguish anything. And death can give this state to animals for a time.

Chapter 2.22.

§ 22

Et comme tout présent état d'une substance simple est naturellement une suite de son état précédent, tellement que le présent y est gros de l'avenir (§ 360) ;

Chapter 2.23.

§ 23

Donc, puisque réveillé de l'étourdissement on s'aperçoit de ses perceptions, il faut bien qu'on en ait eu immédiatement auparavant, quoiqu'on ne s'en soit point aperçu ; car une perception ne saurait venir naturellement que d'une autre perception, comme un mouvement ne peut venir naturellement que d'un mouvement (§ 401-403).

Chapter 2.24.

§ 24

From this we see that if we had nothing distinct and, so to speak, heightened, and of a higher taste in our perceptions, we would always be in a state of stupefaction. And this is the state of bare Monads.

Chapter 2.25.

§ 25

Thus we see that Nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, through the care she has taken to provide them with organs that gather multiple rays of light or multiple waves of air, to make them more effective through their union. There is something similar in smell, taste, and touch, and perhaps in many other senses unknown to us. And I will soon explain how what happens in the soul represents what occurs in the organs.

Chapter 2.26.

§ 26

Memory provides souls with a kind of consecutiveness that imitates reason but must be distinguished from it. We see that animals, having the perception of something that strikes them and of which they have had similar perception before, expect through the representation of their memory what was joined to it in the previous perception and are led to feelings similar to those they had then. For example: when one shows a stick to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them and cry out and flee (Prelim.⁶, § 65).

Chapter 2.27.

§ 27

And the strong imagination that strikes and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the multitude of previous perceptions. For often a strong impression produces at once the effect of a long habit or of many mediocre perceptions repeated.

Chapter 2.28.

§ 28

Men act like beasts insofar as the consecutive series of their perceptions are governed only by the principle of memory; resembling empirical physicians, who have mere practice without theory; and we are empiricists in three-quarters of our actions. For example, when we expect that there will be daylight tomorrow, we act empirically, because this has always happened until now. Only the astronomer judges this through reason.

Chapter 2.29.

§ 29

But the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And this is what we call in us Rational Soul, or Spirit.

Chapter 2.30.

§ 30

It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstractions that we are raised to reflexive acts, which make us think of what we call self and consider that this or that is in us: and it is thus that in thinking of ourselves, we think of Being, of Substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial and of God himself; conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. And these reflexive acts provide the principal objects of our reasoning (Theod., Pref. *, 4, a⁷)

Chapter 2.31.

§ 31

Et il ne s'ensuit point qu'alors la substance simple soit sans aucune perception. Nos raisonnements sont fondés sur deux grands principes, celui de la contradiction en vertu duquel nous jugeons faux ce qui en enveloppe, et vrai ce qui est opposé ou contradictoire au faux (§ 44, § 196).

Chapter 2.32.

§ 32

Et celui de la raison suffisante, en vertu duquel nous considérons qu'aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai, ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans qu'il y ait une raison suffisante pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement. Quoique ces raisons le plus souvent ne puissent point nous être connues (§ 44, § 196).

Chapter 2.33.

§ 33

Il y a aussi deux sortes de vérités, celles de Raisonnement et celle de Fait. Les vérités de Raisonnement sont nécessaires et leur opposé est impossible, et celles de Fait sont contingentes et leur opposé est possible. Quand une vérité est nécessaire, on en peut trouver la raison par l'analyse, la résolvant en idées et en vérités plus simples, jusqu'à ce qu'on vienne aux primitives (§ 170, 174, 189, § 280-282, § 367. Abrégé object. 3).

Chapter 2.34.

§ 34

It is thus that among Mathematicians, speculative theorems and practical canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates.

Chapter 2.35.

§ 35

Et il y a enfin des idées simples dont on ne saurait donner la définition ; il y a aussi des axiomes et demandes, ou en un mot, des principes primitifs, qui ne sauraient être prouvés et n'en ont point besoin aussi ; et ce sont les énonciations identiques, dont l'opposé contient une contradiction expresse (§ 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122, 337, 340-344).

Chapter 2.36.

§ 36

But sufficient reason must also be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, that is, in the sequence of things spread throughout the universe of creatures; where the resolution into particular reasons could go into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in Nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past figures and motions that enter into the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of small inclinations and dispositions of my soul, present and past, that enter into the final cause.

Chapter 2.37.

§ 37

And as all this detail involves only other prior contingents or more detailed ones, each of which needs a similar analysis to give its reason, we are no further ahead: and the sufficient or final reason must be outside the sequence or series of this detail of contingencies, however infinite it might be.

Chapter 2.38.

§ 38

Et c'est ainsi que la dernière raison des choses doit être dans une substance nécessaire, dans laquelle le détail des changements ne soit qu'éminemment, comme dans la source : et c'est ce que nous appelons Dieu (§ 7).

Chapter 2.39.

§ 39

Now this substance being a sufficient reason for all this detail, which is also connected throughout; there is only one God, and this God suffices.

Chapter 2.40.

§ 40

One can also judge that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, having nothing outside it that is independent of it, and being a simple consequence of possible being, must be incapable of limits and contain as much reality as is possible.

Chapter 2.41.

§ 41

D'où il s'ensuit que Dieu est absolument parfait ; la perfection n'étant autre chose que la grandeur de la réalité positive prise précisément, en mettant à part les limites ou bornes dans les choses qui en ont. Et là, où il n'y a point de bornes, c'est-à-dire, en Dieu, la perfection est absolument infinie (§ 22, Préf. *, 4 a).

Chapter 2.42.

§ 42

Il s'ensuit aussi que les créatures ont leurs perfections de l'influence de Dieu, mais qu'elles ont leurs imperfections de leur nature propre, incapable d'être sans bornes. Car c'est en cela qu'elles sont distinguées de Dieu. Cette imperfection originale des créatures se remarque dans l'inertie naturelle des corps (§ 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 et suiv.).

Chapter 2.43.

§ 43

Il est vrai aussi qu'en Dieu est non seulement la source des existences, mais encore celles des essences, en tant que réelles, ou de ce qu'il y a de réel dans la possibilité. c'est parce que l'entendement de Dieu est la région des vérités éternelles, ou des idées dont elles dépendent, et que sans lui il n'y aurait rien de réel dans les possibilités, et non seulement rien d'existant, mais encore rien de possible (§ 20).

Chapter 2.44.

§ 44

Car il faut bien que s'il y a une réalité dans les essences ou possibilités, ou bien dans les vérités éternelles, cette réalité soit fondée en quelque chose d'existant et d'actuel ; et par conséquent dans l'existence de l'Être nécessaire, dans lequel l'essence renferme l'existence, ou dans lequel il suffit d'être possible pour être actuel (§ 184-189, 335).

Chapter 2.45.

§ 45

Thus God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this privilege that He must exist if He is possible. And since nothing can prevent the possibility of that which contains no limits, no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone suffices to know God's existence a priori. We have also proved it through the reality of eternal truths. But we have just proved it also a posteriori since contingent beings exist, which can have their ultimate or sufficient reason only in the necessary being, who has the reason for His existence in Himself.

Chapter 2.46.

§ 46

Cependant il ne faut point s'imaginer avec quelques-uns, que les vérités éternelles, étant dépendantes de Dieu, sont arbitraires et dépendent de sa volonté, comme Descartes paraît l'avoir pris et puis M. Poiret. Cela n'est véritable que des vérités contingentes, dont le principe est la convenance ou le choix du meilleur ; au lieu que les vérités nécessaires dépendent uniquement de son entendement, et en sont l'objet interne (§ 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380).

Chapter 2.47.

§ 47

Ainsi Dieu seul est l'unité primitive, ou la substance simple originaire, dont toutes les Monades créées ou dérivatives sont des productions et naissent, pour ainsi dire, par des Fulgurations continuelles de la Divinité de moment en moment, bornées par la réceptivité de la créature, à laquelle il est essentiel d'être limitée (§ 382-391, 398, 395).

Chapter 2.48.

§ 48

Il y a en Dieu la Puissance, qui est la source de tout, puis la Connaissance qui contient le détail des idées, et enfin la Volonté, qui fait les changements ou productions selon le principe du meilleur (§ 7,149-150). Et c'est ce qui répond à ce qui, dans les monades créées, fait le sujet ou la base, la faculté perceptive et la faculté appétitive. Mais en Dieu ces attributs sont absolument infinis ou parfaits ; et dans les Monades créées ou dans les entéléchies (ou perfectihabies, comme Hermolaüs Barbarus traduisait ce mot) ce n'en sont que des imitations, à mesure qu'il y a de la perfection (§ 87).

Chapter 2.49.

§ 49

La créature est dite agir au-dehors en tant qu'elle a de la perfection, et pâtir d'une autre, en tant qu'elle est imparfaite. Ainsi l'on attribue l'action à la Monade, en tant qu'elle a des perceptions distinctes, et la passion en tant qu'elle en a de confuses (§ 32, 66, 386).

Chapter 2.50.

§ 50

And one creature is more perfect than another insofar as one finds in it that which serves to explain a priori what happens in the other, and it is through this that one says it acts upon the other.

Chapter 2.51.

§ 51

Mais dans les substances simples ce n'est qu'une influence idéale d'une monade sur l'autre, qui ne peut avoir son effet que par l'intervention de Dieu, en tant que dans les idées de Dieu une monade demande avec raison, que Dieu en réglant les autres dès le commencement des choses, ait égard à elle. Car puisqu'une Monade créée ne saurait avoir une influence physique sur l'intérieur de l'autre, ce n'est que par ce moyen que l'une peut avoir de la dépendance de l'autre (§ 9, 54, 65-66, 201. Abrégé object. 3).

Chapter 2.52.

§ 52

Et c'est par là, qu'entre les créatures les actions et passions sont mutuelles. Car Dieu comparant deux substances simples, trouve en chacune des raisons, qui l'obligent à y accommoder l'autre ; et par conséquent ce qui est actif à certains égards, est passif suivant un autre point de considération : actif en tant, que ce qu'on connaît distinctement en lui, sert à rendre raison de ce qui se passe dans un autre ; et passif en tant que la raison de ce qui se passe en lui, se trouve dans ce qui se connaît distinctement dans un autre (§ 66).

Chapter 2.53.

§ 53

Or, comme il y a une infinité d'univers possibles dans les Idées de Dieu et qu'il n'en peut exister qu'un seul, il faut qu'il y ait une raison suffisante du choix de Dieu, qui le détermine à l'un plutôt qu'à l'autre (§ 8, 10, 44, 173, 196 et s., 225, 414-416).

Chapter 2.54.

§ 54

Et cette raison ne peut se trouver que dans la convenance, ou dans les degrés de perfection, que ces mondes contiennent ; chaque possible ayant droit de prétendre à l'existence à mesure de la perfection qu'il enveloppe (§ 74, 167, 350, 201, 130, 352, 345 et s., 354).

Chapter 2.55.

§ 55

Et c'est ce qui est la cause de l'existence du meilleur, que la sagesse fait connaître à Dieu, que sa bonté le fait choisir, et que sa puissance le fait produire (§ 8,7, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abrégé object. 1, object. 8).

Chapter 2.56.

§ 56

Or cette liaison ou cet accommodement de toutes les choses créées à chacune et de chacune à toutes les autres, fait que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres, et qu'elle est par conséquent un miroir vivant perpétuel de l'univers (§ 130,360).

Chapter 2.57.

§ 57

And as the same city viewed from different sides appears entirely different and is, as it were, multiplied perspectively, it similarly happens that, through the infinite multitude of simple substances, there are as many different universes, which are nevertheless only perspectives of a single one according to the different points of view of each Monad.

Chapter 2.58.

§ 58

Et c'est le moyen D'obtenir autant de variété qu'il est possible, mais avec le plus grand ordre, qui se puisse, c'est-à-dire, c'est le moyen D'obtenir autant de perfection qu'il se peut (§ 120, 124, 241 sqq., 214, 243, 275).

Chapter 2.59.

§ 59

Also, it is only this hypothesis (which I dare say is demonstrated) that properly exalts the greatness of God: this is what Mr. Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised objections to it, where he was even tempted to believe that I gave too much to God, more than is possible. But he could not give any reason why this universal harmony, which makes every substance exactly express all others through the relations it has to them, should be impossible.

Chapter 2.60.

§ 60

Moreover, we can see in what I have just reported the a priori reasons why things could not be otherwise. Because God, in regulating the whole, has taken into account each part, and particularly each monad, whose nature being representative, nothing could limit it to representing only a part of things; although it is true that this representation is only confused in the detail of the whole universe, and can be distinct only in a small part of things, that is, in those which are either closest or largest in relation to each Monad; otherwise each monad would be a Divinity. It is not in the object, but in the modification of knowledge of the object, that monads are limited. They all tend confusedly toward the infinite, toward the whole; but they are limited and distinguished by degrees of distinct perceptions.

Chapter 2.61.

§ 61

And compounds symbolize in this with simples. For, as all is full, which makes all matter linked, and as in the plenum all motion has some effect on distant bodies, according to the distance, so that each body is affected not only by those that touch it and feels in some way everything that happens to them, but also through them feels those that touch the first ones by which it is immediately touched: it follows that this communication extends to any distance whatsoever. And consequently, every body feels everything that happens in the universe; such that one who sees all could read in each what happens everywhere and even what has happened or will happen; by observing in the present what is distant, both in time and place: sumpnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a Soul can read in itself only what is distinctly represented there; it cannot unfold all at once all its folds, for they extend to infinity.

Chapter 2.62.

§ 62

Ainsi quoique chaque monade créée représente tout l'univers, elle représente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est affecté particulièrement et dont elle fait l'entéléchie : et comme ce corps exprime tout l'univers par la connexion de toute la matière dans le plein, l'âme représente aussi tout l'univers en représentant ce corps, qui lui appartient d'une manière particulière (§ 400).

Chapter 2.63.

§ 63

Le corps appartenant à une Monade, qui en est l'entéléchie ou l'Âme, constitue avec l'entéléchie ce qu'on peut appeler un vivant, et avec l'âme ce qu'on appelle un animal. Or ce corps d'un vivant ou d'un animal est toujours organique ; car toute Monade étant un miroir de l'univers à sa mode, et l'univers étant réglé dans un ordre parfait, il faut qu'il y ait aussi un ordre dans le représentant, c'est-à-dire dans les perceptions de l'âme, et par conséquent dans le corps, suivant lequel l'univers y est représenté (§ 403).

Chapter 2.64.

§ 64

Ainsi chaque corps organique d'un vivant est une espèce de machine divine, ou d'un automate naturel, qui surpasse infiniment tous les automates artificiels. Parce qu'une machine faite par l'art de l'homme, n'est pas machine dans chacune de ses parties. Par exemple : la dent d'une roue de laiton a des parties ou fragments qui ne nous sont plus quelque chose d'artificiel et n'ont plus rien, qui marque de la machine par rapport à l'usage, où la roue était destinée. Mais les machines de la nature, c'est-à-dire les corps vivants, sont encore machines dans leurs moindres parties, jusqu'à l'infini. c'est ce qui fait la différence entre la Nature et l'art, c'est-à-dire entre l'art Divin et le nôtre (§ 134, 146, 194, 483).

Chapter 2.65.

§ 65

And the author of nature has been able to practice this divine and infinitely marvelous artifice because each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible as the ancients recognized, but is actually subdivided without end, each part into parts, each of which has some proper motion; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe (Prelim. [Disc. d. l. conform.], § 70. Theod., §195).

Chapter 2.66.

§ 66

Whereby one sees that there is a world of creatures, of living things, of animals, of entelechies, of souls in the smallest part of matter.

Chapter 2.67.

§ 67

Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of the plant, each member of the animal, each drop of its humors is still such a garden or such a pond.

Chapter 2.68.

§ 68

And although the earth and air intercepted between the plants of the garden, or the water intercepted between the fish of the pond, is neither plant nor fish; they still contain them, but most often of a subtlety imperceptible to us.

Chapter 2.69.

§ 69

Thus there is nothing uncultivated, sterile, or dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion except in appearance; much like what would appear in a pond from a distance where one would see a confused motion and swarming, so to speak, of the fish in the pond, without discerning the fish themselves.

Chapter 2.70.

§ 70

One sees by this that each living body has a dominant entelechy which is the soul in the animal; but the members of this living body are full of other living things, plants, animals, each of which has again its entelechy, or its dominant soul.

Chapter 2.71.

§ 71

But one must not imagine, as some who had misunderstood my thought did, that each soul has a mass or portion of matter proper or assigned to it forever, and that it consequently possesses other inferior living beings, always destined for its service. For all bodies are in perpetual flux like rivers, and parts enter and leave them continually.

Chapter 2.72.

§ 72

Thus the soul changes its body only gradually and by degrees, so that it is never stripped all at once of all its organs; and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or transmigration of Souls: there are also no completely separate Souls, nor spirits without bodies. God alone is entirely detached from them.

Chapter 2.73.

§ 73

This is also why there is never either complete generation nor perfect death taken in the strictest sense, consisting in the separation of the soul. And what we call Generations are developments and growths; as what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.

Chapter 2.74.

§ 74

Philosophers have been very perplexed about the origin of forms, entelechies, or Souls; but nowadays, when it has been perceived, through exact research done on plants, insects, and animals, that the organic bodies of nature are never produced from chaos or putrefaction, but always from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some preformation; it has been judged that not only was the organic body already present before conception, but also a soul in this body, and in short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this animal has only been disposed to a great transformation to become an animal of another species.

Chapter 2.75.

§ 75

The animals, of which some are elevated to the degree of larger animals by means of conception, can be called spermatic; but those among them which remain in their species, that is, the majority, are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the large animals, and there is only a small number of elect ones that pass to a greater theater.

Chapter 2.76.

§ 76

But this was only half the truth: I have therefore judged that if the animal never begins naturally, it also never ends naturally; and that not only will there be no generation, but also no entire destruction, nor death taken in the strictest sense. And these reasonings made a posteriori and drawn from experiments accord perfectly with my principles deduced a priori as above.

Chapter 2.77.

§ 77

Thus one can say that not only the soul (mirror of an indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, although its machine often perishes in part, and takes off or puts on organic spoils.

Chapter 2.78.

§ 78

These principles have given me a way to naturally explain the union or conformity of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws and the body follows its own as well; and they meet by virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of the same universe.

Chapter 2.79.

§ 79

Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or movements. And the two kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are harmonious with each other.

Chapter 2.80.

§ 80

Descartes recognized that souls cannot give force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. However, he believed that the soul could change the direction of bodies. But this was because in his time the law of nature, which also maintains the conservation of the same total direction in matter, was not known. Had he noticed it, he would have arrived at my System of Pre-established Harmony.

Chapter 2.81.

§ 81

This System makes bodies act as if (impossibly) there were no souls; and Souls act as if there were no bodies; and both act as if one influenced the other.

Chapter 2.82.

§ 82

As for Spirits or Rational Souls, although I find that fundamentally the same thing exists in all living beings and animals, as we have just said (namely that the animal and the soul begin only with the world and likewise do not end before the world), there is nevertheless something particular about Rational Animals: their small spermatic Animals, as long as they are only that, have only ordinary or sensitive souls; but when those that are elected, so to speak, attain through actual conception to human nature, their sensitive souls are elevated to the degree of reason and to the prerogative of Spirits.

Chapter 2.83.

§ 83

Among other differences between ordinary Souls and Spirits, of which I have already noted some, there is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of creatures; but spirits are also images of the Divinity itself, or of the author of nature himself: capable of knowing the system of the universe and of imitating something of it through architectonic samples; each spirit being like a small divinity in its department.

Chapter 2.84.

§ 84

This is what makes Spirits capable of entering into a kind of Society with God, and that He is to them not only what an inventor is to his Machine (as God is in relation to other creatures) but also what a Prince is to his subjects, and even a father to his children.

Chapter 2.85.

§ 85

From which it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all Spirits must compose the City of God, that is, the most perfect State possible under the most perfect of Monarchs.

Chapter 2.86.

§ 86

This City of God, this truly universal Monarchy is a Moral World within the Natural world, and what is highest and most divine in God's works: and it is in this that God's glory truly consists, since there would be none if His greatness and goodness were not known and admired by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine City that He properly has Goodness, while His wisdom and power are shown everywhere.

Chapter 2.87.

§ 87

Comme nous avons établi ci-dessus une Harmonie parfaite entre deux Règnes naturels, l'un des causes Efficientes, l'autre des Finales, nous devons remarquer ici encore une autre harmonie entre le règne Physique de la Nature et le règne Moral de la Grâce, c'est-à-dire, entre Dieu considéré comme Architecte de la Machine de l'univers, et Dieu considéré comme Monarque de la Cité divine des Esprits (§ 62, 74, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247).

Chapter 2.88.

§ 88

Cette Harmonie fait que les choses conduisent à la Grâce par les voies mêmes de la Nature, et que ce globe par exemple doit être détruit et réparé par les voies naturelles dans les moments que le demande le gouvernement des Esprits ; pour le châtiment des uns, et la récompense des autres (§ 18 sqq., 110, 244-245, 340).

Chapter 2.89.

§ 89

One can also say that God as Architect satisfies in everything God as legislator; and thus sins must carry their punishment with them through the order of nature and by virtue of the very mechanical structure of things; and likewise good actions will attract their rewards through mechanical ways with respect to bodies; although this cannot and should not always happen immediately.

Chapter 2.90.

§ 90

Finally, under this perfect government there would be no good Action without reward, no bad one without punishment: and everything must work out for the good of the good; that is, of those who are not malcontents in this great State, who trust in Providence, after having done their duty, and who love and imitate, as they should, the Author of all good, taking pleasure in the consideration of His perfections according to the nature of true pure love, which makes one take pleasure in the happiness of what one loves. This is what makes wise and virtuous people work at everything that appears to conform to the presumptive divine will, or antecedent will; and be content nevertheless with what God actually brings about through His secret will, consequent and decisive; recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we would find that it surpasses all the wishes of the wisest, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is; not only for the whole in general, but also for ourselves in particular, if we are properly attached to the Author of all, not only as the Architect and efficient cause of our being, but also as our Master and the final cause that must be the whole aim of our will, and can alone make our happiness (Pref. *, 4 a b¹⁴. § 278. Pref. *, 4 b¹⁵).

END

¹⁴ Edit. Erdm., p. 469.
¹⁵ Edit. Erdm., p. 469 b.

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